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!] Supreme Court Decisions
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-EVIDENCE-No.

]

14449-Decided De-

cember 5, 1938--Schwab us. Industrial Commission-District
Court of Weld County-Hon. FredericW. Clark, Judge-Affirmed
-In Department.
HELD:
1. Evidence examined and found to sustain finding of
commission and district court that it was insufficent to prove the physiological or anatomical sequence between injury to kidney and the pain of
which claimant complains.
2. Where the record does not disclose any sale at which claimant
acted as auctioneer, his statement, that he cannot act as auctioneer because
he cannot take a deep breath and therefore, his earning capacity is
diminished, is "hardly convincing."
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Chief Justice Burke, Mr.
Justice Hilliard and Mr. Justice Holland, concur.

AUTOMOBILES-NEGLIGENCE-GUEST STATUTE-WILFULNESS AND
WANTONESS-No. 14154-Decided December 5, 1938-Bashor

vs. Bashor, et al.-DistrictCourt of Boulder County-Hon. Frederic W. Clark, Judge-On Rehearing-Originalopinion reversing
judgment adhered to.
HELD:
1. Where it appears that the driver of an automobile,
which was involved in an accident resulting in the death of one of the
occupants and injuries to the others, was on friendly terms with all of
the occupants of the car, that no protest was made by anyone as to the
speed or manner in which he was driving, that there was no evidence
that any one of the passengers felt any apprehension of danger, that
he was engaged in locating a radio station broadcasting a program by
operating the car radio dial which was on the steering wheel post while
he drove with only his left hand, that he was driving at a speed of 45
to 55 miles per hour at 2:00 o'clock in the morning, that he didn't
see the car in front of him until someone in the car directed his attention
to it, that it was then only 50 feet in front of him, that he then swerved
to avoid a collision and lost control of his car, that he could have
avoided the accident had he not negligently withdrawn his attention from
the road to dial the radio, but that there was nothing he could do to
avoid the accident other than what he did do after he became aware

DICTA
of the situation, there is not enough to show that the accident resulted
from the driver's "negligence consisting of a wilful and wanton disregard
of the rights of others" as required by the Colorado Automobile Guest
Statute. (Chapter 118 S. L. 1931, Chap. 16, sec. 371, C. S. A. 1935.)
2. Mere unconscious inattention, under such circumstances, and
up to the amount of warning by the passenger in the front seat is not an
omission of such character as to justify a finding that one could not be
guilty of such inattention and at the same time have a natural and normal
concern for the safety of others who might be harmed as a result of it.
It was not wanton.
3. Where the driver states after the accident that he was responsible for it, that it was caused by his recklessness, that he was indifferent
to consequences while engaged in driving the car, in the light of the
undisputed evidence as to what all the parties in the car did and did not
do, such statements are but mere conclusions as to the legal effect of his
conduct and therefore not properly to be taken into consideration as
evidence.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Young. Mr. Justice Hilliard and Mr.
Justice Bouck dissenting. Mr. Chief Justice Burke and Mr. Justice
Holland not participating.
INSURANCE-DEATH BENEFIT CERTIFICATES-DEATH OF INSURED
WHILE VIOLATING CRIMINAL LAW-EVIDENCE-DIRECTED
VERDICT-No. 14394-Decided December 5, 1938-International Service Union Association vs. Martinez-District Court of
Denver-Hon. Henry S. Lindsley, Judge-Affirmed-En Banc.
FACTS:
Plaintiff as beneficiary under a death benefit certificate
issued by defendant upon the lives of the members of plaintiff's family,
brought suit to recover on the certificate upon the death of one of the
family. The defense was that the policy did not cover "death occurring
while violating any criminal law," and that the deceased received the
wound from which he died while committing a criminal assault upon
a third party. The decedent had been engaged in an altercation with
a third party, and after separating, a scuffle took place in which another
person picked up the third party's gun and shot. The third person and
his friend were tried for murder and acquitted. The trial court after
hearing all the evidence refused to direct a verdict in this case.
HELD: 1. There was enough evidence to go to the jury upon
which it might have found that the third party was the aggressor or
that even if the decedent was the aggressor the jury might reasonably

DICTA
infer in the light of a situation well calculated to induce a reasonable man
so situated to be apprehensive of danger, that in taking the aggressive
he acted in self defense.
2. The acquittal of the third parties of murder is not conclusive
that the decedent was engaged in violating a criminal law so as to deprive
the beneficiary from recovery under the policy.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Young.
LIFE INSURANCE-ASSIGNMENT-No. 14308-Decided December 5,
1938-Rahe us. PrudentialInsurance Company-District Court
of Pueblo County-Hon. William B. Stewart, Judge-ReversedIn Department.
FACTS: Decedent, insured under insurance policy made payable
"to executors or administrators of the insured," wrote and signed an
instrument requesting that the policy be paid to her father (plaintiff).
There was no provision in the policy for assignment. When she died,
plaintiff brought action in the county court asking that the administrator
be adjudged without claim and that the company be ordered to pay him
the proceeds. By stipulation, insurance company paid money into court
and was discharged. The demurrer of the administrator was overruled
and upon trial there was verdict and judgment for plaintiff. On appeal
to the district court, the demurrer was sustained.
HELD: It is immaterial whether the document was an assignment
or an attempt to change beneficiaries. The policy was a chose in action
and subject to all the conditions of such. It was the property of the
insured and no one had any rights therein. The restriction in the policy
as to changing terms without consent of company was for the sole benefit
of the company. No other could take advantage of it.
2. Where the insured names no beneficiary in her policy, except
her legal representatives, the insured was free to do as she pleased with it.
Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Burke, Mr. Justice Hilliard, Mr.
Justice Bakke and Mr. Justice Holland, concur.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-No. 14365-Decided September 19,
1938-Rogers et al us. Solem et al.-District Court, DenverHon. Otto Bock, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: Claimant alleged that he suffered an injury to his right
eye while drilling in a mine, when pieces of steel and rock struck the
eyeball. Later the eye had to be removed. The mine was owned by
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two women who employed L. as their agent in the management of the
property. L. took his instructions from R. who was son of one of
the owners and nephew of the other. R. claimed that he acted only
for his mother although the functions which he performed were equally
as beneficial to the other owner. When apprized of the injury to
claimant, R. gave L. his personal check for $200.00 to be used by L.
for the benefit of claimant in any manner he saw fit. Actually, $150.00
of this sum was expended for claimant's relief. The owners claimed
a leasing arrangement between L. and the claimant.
HELD:
1. The legal relationship of all the parties was such
as to make the owners of the property liable to claimant for compensation under the Act. '35 C. S. A., Vol. 3, C. 97, Sec. 328, C. L.
4423.
2. The purpose of this section of the law is to prevent evasion
of the insurance requirements of the act by leasing.
3.
The payment of the $150.00 was "payment of compensation" within the meaning of Section 363, Chap. 97, supra.
4. Evidence considered and found to be sufficient upon which
to base finding that removal of eye was necessitated by the accident.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Justice Burke, Mr. Justice
Hilliard, and Mr. Justice Holland concur.

PLEADING-REPLICATION-DENIALS-No. 14407-Decided December 5, 1938-Zucerman vs. W. E. Guthner-DistrictCourt of
Denver-Hon. Henry A. Hicks, Judge-Reversed-In Department.
FACTS:
Plaintiff sued in replevin to recover certain automobiles
alleged to belong to him but which the defendant took into his possession
from one, G. The defendant as sheriff, levied upon the chattels and took
them into his custody by authority of an execution issued upon .a judgment against G. Under the assignments of error the decisive question
for determination is whether or not the replication put in issue certain
controlling allegations of the third and separate defense. The replication stated as follows:
Plaintiff denies the allegations contained in paragraph three in said
thid, further and separate defense in the manner and form as therein alleged and set out and plaintiff alleges that said automobiles in question
were delivered to the said Gerick to be sold by the said Gerick as the
property of the plaintiff herein and the proceds from said sale to be
delivered to the plaintiff herein by the said Gerick and that the said Gerick
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would be entitled to a certain commission upon his selling the said automobiles."
The trial court sustained a demurrer to the replication and plaintiff
elected to stand upon his pleading.
HELD: 1. "Under section 62 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
denials must be either general or specific and, further, must be positive
unless in the form of the statutory denial upon information and belief.
The fact that section 77 of the Code provides inter alia, that: 'The replication may be general in terms denying all new matters set up in the
answer,' does not alter the situation where that method of pleading is not
adopted."
2. " 'The denials must, however, be clear and unequivocal. Evasive denials are not sufficient. Hence literal and conjunctive denials, or
denials merely in manner and form, or which fail to deny the averment
in the complaint intended to be controverted in its substance and intent,
are insufficient to raise an issue.' "
3. "Standing alone, therefore, the denial, 'in the manner and
form' merely, does not controvert the allegations,
* * *" but in
"addition to making this ineffective denial, plaintiff in the same paragraph pleads affirmative matter in the nature of avoidance, alleging an
agency, or bailment of the automobiles inconsistent with the situation
disclosed by the allegations" in the paragraph of the answer relied upon
by defendant as forming the basis of the estoppel he seeks to assert.
4. "Such affirmative averments of fact contrary to, or inconsistent
with those alleged in the pleading of the adversary to which they are
directed are equivalent to a denial."
Opinion by Mr. Justice Knous. Mr. Chief Justice Burke, Mr.
Justice Bouck and Mr. Justice Young concur.

CRIMINAL LAW-RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL-No. 14426-Decided

August 31, 1938t--In re: Harry Schechtel--Original proceeding
for a writ of habeas corpus-Petition for writ denied-In Department.
FACTS: Petitioner, while serving sentence to imprisonment imposed 10-5-35 by Federal District Court had indictment returned
against him by a grand jury in state district court on an alleged offense
distinct from that involved in the federal conviction. The state district attorney requested the warden of the federal reformatory to detain
the petitioner upon completion of the federal sentence, for delivery to
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a Colorado officer, for return to this state for trial on the state indictment. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the state indictment on the
ground that he had been denied the right to a speedy trial of the charges
in it. The motion was dismissed.
HELD:
1. No constitutional right of the petitioner to a speedy
trial was violated by failure of the state to put him- on trial while he
was in the custody of the United States and serving a sentence in her
prisons for a violation of her laws.
2. There is no obligation, under such circumstances, upon the
state's prosecuting authorities to make application to the federal government for the return of a federal prisoner to the state for trial on state
charges.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Knous. Mr. Justice Hilliard, Mr. Justice
Young, and Mr. Justice Bakke concur,

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-FARM AND RANCH LABORERS-COMMERCIAL AND BUSINESS ENTERPRISES-No. 14446-Decided
December 12, 1938-Hill, et a[. us. Bunher-District Court of
Saguache-Hon. J. I. Palmer, Judge-Reversed-In Department.
FACTS:
Workmen's compensation case in which the claimant alleges that while employed by defendant in error, as a hay stacker on
July 7, 1937, he was knocked from a stack of hay by a mechanical
stacker and suffered the injuries which form the basis of his claim.
Defendant in error was engaged in the business of farming. When not
occupied on his own premises, he undertook the cutting and stacking
of hay for others for hire. While thus engaged he employs the services
of more than four employees. He did not carry workman's compensation insurance. Hill was one of the men employed by defendant in error.
The question involved is whether Hill, the employee and claimant, was
not a "farm and ranch laborer" and, hence, entitled to compensation.
HELD:
When Bunker, defendant in error, year after year, with
extensive and special equipment, with a crew of 15 or more men set out
to serve the public generally, he engaged in a commercial or business enterprise, distinguished from his own farming operations, and his employees
were not farm laborers within the stautory exception, so as to exempt
him from the provisions of the act.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Chief Justice Burke, Mr. Justice
Hilliard and Mr. Justice Holland, concur.

DICTA
QUIET TITLE-TAX DEED---NOTICE-No. 14388-Decided October
3, 1938-Brown vs. Davis-DistrictCourt of Logan CountyHon. H. E. Munson, Judge-Reversed.
HELD:
1. Notice preceding the issuance of tax deed (as prescribed by section 255, chapter 142, C. S. A., 1935) although given
to record owner of lots, must also be given to party in actual occupancy or possession of the lots, although the latter is tenant of
record owner--otherwise tax deed is void.
2. It is not for the Supreme Court to determine the necessity
of requiring the tenant to be personally served, in such instances,
where the owner has been personally served-the statute requires it.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Knous. Mr. Chief Justice Burke not
Mr. Justice Bouck, dissenting.
participating.

PARENT

AND CHILD-CUSTODY OF CHILDREN-No.

14414-De-

cided October 3, 1938-In re: People ex rel. McChesney vs. McChesney--Juvenile Court of Denver-Hon. Eugene J. Madden,
Jr., Judge-Reversed-En Banc.
1. Where it appears that the District Court in divorce
HELD:
action, upon proper hearing awarded child to father, that child was
being sent to school, that he was provided with suitable and sufficient
clothing, that he was properly fed, it cannot be said that a "controversy" exists as to the custody of the child within the sense in which
such word is used in the dependency statute (Sec. 1, Chap. 33, 1935,
C. S. A.) although the mother objects to father's custody and child
prefers to be with mother.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Young. Mr. Justice Hilliard dissents.

EQUITY-RIGHT-OF-WAY-ADVERSE POSSESSION-RATIFICATION OF
CONTRACTS-No. 14420-Decided December 12, 1938-Perry,

et al. vs. Bunten-District Court of Montrose-Hon. Straud M.
Logan, Judge-Affrmed-En Banc.
HELD: No reversible or prejudicial error was found in the above
entitled case wherein an action was brought to restrain plaintiffs in error
from using a strip of land claimed by defendent in error, and from breaking and tearing down gates and fences thereon, and for damages. The
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parties hereto have been neighbors for many years, both deriving title
from the same grantor. Defendant in error claimed to have acquired
a right of way over plaintiffs' in error land by an express agreement which
their father had with plaintiffs' in error grantor, further strengthened
by adverse use which had been continuous, uninterrupted, exclusive, open
and notorious for over 26 years. Also, that after defendant in error
acquired his property he agreed to the prior agreement as to the right-ofway, therefore ratifying the same. As to this latter alleged ratification,
it was held that there was not sufficient consideration to sustain the same.
However, the case was affirmed because of no prejudicial error.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck. Mr. Justice Knous not participating.

MISCELLANA
THE LAW'S DELAY
"About 560 years before Christ. Solon made reference to the slowness of justice; Horace in the year 24 B. C. announced that justice was
still 'moving slowly;' Shakespeare in 1601 had Hamlet include 'the
law's delay' among those things that justified suicide; a third of a century
later George Herbert complained that 'lawsuits consume time,' said Frank
J. Hogan, President of the American Bar Association in a recent address.
"A century passed during which the changes were rung on this
ancient complaint until Bishop Burnet, in his 'History of His Own
Times,' in 1723, set it down that 'the law of England is the greatest
grievance of the nation, very expensive and dilatory.'
"Dickens devoted a volume to the subject, and Walter Savage
Landor, in his 'Imaginary Conversations,' gave us the since overworked
phrase 'delay of justice is injustice.'
"We are at death grips in America with this age-old problem of
government. Progress, gratifying progress, has been made. Let us
tighten our hold and go on until the history of our time will record
as its great achievement justice, sure and speedy, for all." The Cleteland

Bar Association Journal.
Colored Mammy-"Ah wants to see Judge Harding."
Oflce Boy-"Judge Harding is engaged."
Colored Mammy-"Ah don' want to marry him honey, Ah jus'
wants to see him."

